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Abstract
The right to be forgotten states that a data owner has the right
to erase her data from an entity storing it. In the context of
machine learning (ML), the right to be forgotten requires an
ML model owner to remove the data owner’s data from the
training set used to build the ML model, a process known as
machine unlearning. While originally designed to protect the
privacy of the data owner, we argue that machine unlearning
may leave some imprint of the data in the ML model and thus
create unintended privacy risks.
In this paper, we perform the first study on investigating
the unintended information leakage caused by machine un-
learning. We propose a novel membership inference attack
which leverages the different outputs of an ML model’s two
versions to infer whether the deleted sample is part of the
training set. Our experiments over five different datasets
demonstrate that the proposed membership inference attack
achieves strong performance. More importantly, we show
that our attack in multiple cases outperforms the classical
membership inference attack on the original ML model,
which indicates that machine unlearning can have counter-
productive effects on privacy. We notice that the privacy
degradation is especially significant for well-generalized ML
models where classical membership inference does not per-
form well. We further investigate two mechanisms to mit-
igate the newly discovered privacy risks and show that the
only effective mechanism is to release the predicted label
only. We believe that our results can help improve privacy
in practical implementation of machine unlearning.
1 Introduction
The right to be forgotten, or right to erasure, entitles data
owners the right to delete their data from an entity storing
it. Recently enacted legislations, such as the General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR)1 in the European Union and
the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA)2 in California,
1https://gdpr-info.eu/
2https://oag.ca.gov/privacy/ccpa
have legally solidified this right. Google Search has received
nearly 3.2 million requests to delist certain URLs in search
results over five years [8].
In the machine learning context, the right to be forgotten
requires that, in addition to the data itself, any influence of
the data on the model disappears [10, 59]. This process, also
called machine unlearning, has gained momentum both in
academia and industry [7, 9, 10, 17, 18, 20, 27, 35, 50, 55, 62].
The most legit way to implement machine unlearning is to
remove the data sample requested to be deleted (referred to
as target sample), and retrain the ML model from scratch,
but this incurs high computational overhead. Recently, Bour-
toule et al. [9] have proposed an approximate method to ac-
celerate the machine unlearning process.
Machine unlearning naturally generates two versions of
the ML model, namely the original model and the unlearned
model, and creates a discrepancy between those due to the
target sample’s deletion. While originally designed to pro-
tect the privacy of the target, we argue that machine unlearn-
ing may leave some imprint of the target sample, and thus
create unintended privacy risks. More specifically, while
the original model may not reveal much private informa-
tion about the target, additional information might be leaked
through the unlearned model.
1.1 Our Contributions
In this paper, we study to what extent data is indelibly im-
printed in an ML model by quantifying the additional in-
formation leakage caused by machine unlearning. We con-
centrate on machine learning classification, the most com-
mon machine learning task, and assume both original and
unlearned models to be black-box, the most challenging set-
ting for an adversary.
We first propose a novel membership inference attack
in the machine unlearning setting that aims at determining
whether the target sample is part of the training set of the
original model. Different from classical membership infer-
ence attacks [49, 54] which leverage the output (posterior)
of a single target model, our attack leverages outputs of both
original and unlearned models. More concretely, we propose
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several aggregation methods to jointly use the two posteriors
from the two models as our attack model’s input, either by
concatenating them or by computing their differences. Our
empirical results show that the concatenation-based meth-
ods perform better in overfitted models, while the difference-
based methods perform better in well-generalized models.
Second, to quantify the unintended privacy risks incurred
by machine unlearning, we propose two novel privacy met-
rics, namely Degradation Count and Degradation Rate.
Both of them concentrate on measuring how much relative
privacy the target has lost due to machine unlearning. Con-
cretely, Degradation Count calculates the proportion of cases
where the adversary’s confidence about the membership sta-
tus of the target sample is larger with our attack than with
classical membership inference attack. Degradation Rate
calculates the average absolute increase of confidence be-
tween our attack and classical membership inference.
We conduct extensive experiments to evaluate the perfor-
mance of our attack over a series of ML models, ranging
from logistic regression to convolutional neural networks,
with multiple categorical datasets and image datasets. The
experimental results show that our attack consistently de-
grades the membership privacy of the target sample, which
indicates machine unlearning can have counterproductive ef-
fects on privacy. In particular, we observe that privacy is es-
pecially degraded because of machine unlearning in the case
of well-generalized models. For example, we observe that
the classical membership inference attack has an accuracy
(measured by AUC) close to 0.5, or random guessing, on
the low-overfitted decision tree classifier. On the contrary,
the AUC of our attack is 0.89, and the Degradation Count
and Degradation Rate are 0.85 and 0.28, respectively, which
demonstrates that machine unlearning can have a detrimen-
tal effect on membership privacy even with well-generalized
models. We further show that we can effectively infer mem-
bership information when a group of samples (instead of
a single one) are deleted together from the original target
model.
Finally, in order to mitigate the privacy risks stemming
from machine unlearning, we propose two possible defense
mechanisms: (i) publishing only the top k confidence val-
ues of the posterior, and (ii) publishing only the predicted
label. The experimental results show that our attack is very
robust to the top k defense, even when the model owner only
releases the top 1 confidence value. On the other hand, pub-
lishing only the predicted label can effectively prevent our
attack.
To summarize, we show that machine unlearning will de-
grade privacy of the target sample in general. This discovery
sheds light on the risks of implementing the right to be for-
gotten in the ML context. We believe that our attack and
metrics will help develop more privacy-preserving machine
unlearning approach. The main contributions of this paper
are four-fold:
• We take the first step to quantify the unintended privacy
risks in machine unlearning through the lens of mem-
bership inference attacks.
• We propose several practical approaches for aggregat-
ing the information returned by the two versions of the
ML models.
• We propose two novel metrics to measure the privacy
degradation stemming from machine unlearning and
conduct extensive experiments to show the effective-
ness of our attack.
• We propose two defense mechanisms to mitigate the
privacy risks stemming from our attack and empirically
evaluate their effectiveness.
1.2 Organization
Section 2 introduces some background knowledge about ma-
chine learning and machine unlearning, and the threat model.
Section 3 present the details of our proposed attack. We pro-
pose two privacy degradation metrics in Section 4. We con-
duct extensive experiments to illustrate the effectiveness of
the proposed attack in Section 5. In Section 6, we intro-
duce several possible defense mechanisms and empirically
evaluate their effectiveness. We discuss the related work in
Section 7 and conclude the paper in Section 8.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we first introduce some background knowl-
edge on machine learning and unlearning, and then we
present the threat model.
2.1 Machine Learning
In this paper, we focus on machine learning classification,
the most common machine learning task. An ML classifier
M maps a data sample x to posterior probabilities y, where y
is a vector of entries indicating the probability of x belonging
to a certain class according to the model M . The sum of all
values in y is 1 by definition. To construct an ML model, one
needs to collect a set of data samples, referred to as the train-
ing setD . The model is then built through a training process
that aims at minimizing a predefined loss function with some
optimization algorithms, such as stochastic gradient descent
(SGD).
2.2 Machine Unlearning
Recent legislations such as GDPR and CCPA enact the “right
to be forgotten”, which allows individuals to request the
deletion of their data by the service provider to preserve their
privacy. In the context of machine learning, e.g., MLaaS, this
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implies that the model owner should remove the target sam-
ple x from its training set D . Moreover, any influence x has
on the model M should also be removed. This process is
referred to as machine unlearning.
Retraining from Scratch. The most legit way to implement
machine unlearning is to retrain the whole ML model from
scratch. Formally, denoting the original model as Mo and
its training dataset as Do, this approach consists of train-
ing a new model Mu on dataset Du = Do \ x.3 We call this
Mu the unlearned model. Retraining from scratch is easy to
implement. However, when the size of the original dataset
Do is large and the model is complex, the computational
overhead of retraining is too large. To reduce the computa-
tional overhead, several approximate approaches have been
proposed [7, 10, 27, 50], among which SISA [9] works in an
ensemble style and is the most general one.
SISA. The training dataset Do in SISA is partitioned into
k disjoint parts D1o ,D2o , · · · ,Dko . The model owner trains a
set of original ML models M 1o ,M 2o , · · · ,M ko on each cor-
responding dataset D io. When the model owner receives a
request to delete a data sample x, it just needs to retrain the
sub-model M io that contains x, which results in unlearning
model M iu . Sub-models that do not contain x remain un-
changed. Notice that the size of dataset D io is much smaller
than Do; thus, the computational overhead of SISA is much
smaller than the “retraining from scratch” method.
At inference time, the model owner aggregates predictions
from the different sub-models to provide an overall predic-
tion. The most commonly used aggregation strategy is ma-
jority vote and posterior average. In our experiments, we use
posterior average as aggregation strategy.
2.3 Threat Model
The objective of the adversary is to perform membership in-
ference towards the target sample, i.e., to determine whether
a given target sample x is in the training set of the original
model [49, 54]. Knowing that a specific data sample x was
used to train a particular model may lead to potential privacy
breach. For example, knowing that a certain patient’s clinical
records were used to train a model associated with a disease
(e.g., to determine the appropriate drug dosage or to discover
the genetic basis of the disease) can reveal that the patient
carries the associated disease. The classical membership in-
ference attack can achieve this objective by exploiting the
output (typically posterior distribution over possible classes)
returned by the original model. In the machine unlearning
setting, the adversary has access to the outputs of both the
original model and the unlearned model; thus he can exploit
3Note that we also study the removal of more than one sample in our
experimental evaluation, but for simplicity we formalize our problem with
one sample only.
two versions of posteriors to launch the membership infer-
ence attack towards the target sample.
Similar to previous membership inference attacks [49,54],
we assume the adversary has black-box access to the mod-
els. This means that the adversary can only query these mod-
els and obtain their corresponding posteriors. Compared to
the white-box setting, where the adversary has direct access
to the architecture and parameters of the target model, the
black-box setting is more realistic, and more challenging for
the adversary [39]. We further assume that the adversary
has a shadow dataset which can be used to train a set of
shadow models to mimic the behavior of the target model.
The shadow models are then used to generate another dataset
to train the attack model (see Section 3 for more details). The
shadow dataset can either come from the same distribution as
the target dataset or from a different one. We evaluate both
settings in Section 5.
3 Membership Inference in
Unlearning
In this section, we detail our membership inference attack in
the machine unlearning setting.
3.1 Attack Pipeline
The general attack pipeline of our attack is illustrated in Fig-
ure 1. It consists of three phases: posterior generation, fea-
ture construction and (membership) inference.
Posterior Generation. The adversary has access to two ver-
sions of the target ML models, the original modelMo and the
unlearned model Mu. Given a target sample x, the adversary
queries Mo and Mu, and obtains the corresponding posteri-
ors, i.e., Po and Pu, also referred to as confidence values or
levels [54].
Feature Construction. Given the two posteriors Po and Pu,
the adversary aggregates them to construct the feature vector
F. There are several alternatives to construct the feature. We
discuss them in Section 3.3.
Inference. Finally, the adversary feed obtained F to the at-
tack model, which is a binary classifier, to determine whether
the target sample x is in the training set of the original model
or not. We describe how to build the attack model in Sec-
tion 3.2.
3.2 Attack Model Training
We assume the adversary has a local dataset, which we call
the shadow dataset Ds. The shadow dataset can come from
a different distribution than the one used to train the target
model. To infer whether the target sample x is in the origi-
nal model or not, our approach is to train a binary classifier
3
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Figure 1: A schematic view of the general attack pipeline.
MA that captures the difference between the two posteriors.
The intuition is that, if the target sample x is deleted, the
two models Mo and Mu will behave differently. Figure 2
illustrates the training process of the attack model, and the
detailed training procedure is presented as follows.
Training Shadow Models. To mimic the behavior of the
target models, the adversary needs to train a shadow orig-
inal model and a set of shadow unlearned models. To do
this,the adversary first partitions Ds into two disjoint parts,
the shadow negative set Dsn and the shadow positive set Dsp.
The shadow positive set Dsp is used to train the shadow orig-
inal model M so . The shadow unlearned model M su is trained
by deleting samples from Dsp. For ease of presentation,
we assume the shadow unlearned model M su is obtained by
deleting exactly one sample. We will show that our attack
is still effective for group deletion in Section 5.7. The ad-
versary randomly generates a set of deletion requests (tar-
get samples) Rp = {x1p,x2p, · · · ,xmp } and train a set of shadow
unlearned models M s,1u ,M s,2u , · · · ,M s,mu , where shadow un-
learned model M s,iu is trained on dataset Dsp \ xip.
Obtaining Posteriors. At the posterior generation phase,
the adversary feeds each target sample xip ∈Rp to the shadow
original model M so and its corresponding shadow unlearned
model M s,iu , and gets two posteriors Pio and Piu.
Constructing Features. The adversary then uses the feature
construction methods discussed in Section 3.3 to construct
training cases for the attack model. In classical membership
inference, posteriors of xip ∈Rp serve as member cases of the
attack model. But in the machine unlearning setting, xip ∈Rp
is member of shadow original model M so and non-member
of shadow unlearned model M su . To avoid confusion, we
call the samples related to xip ∈ Rp positive cases instead of
member cases for the attack model.
To train the attack model, the adversary also needs a set of
negative cases. This can be done by sampling a set of nega-
tive query samples Rn from the shadow negative dataset Dsn
and query the shadow original model and unlearned model.
To get a good model generalization performance, the adver-
sary needs to ensure that the number of positive cases and the
number of negative cases of the attack model are balanced,
i.e., |Rp| = |Rn|, where | · | is the cardinality of the sample
set.
Improving Diversity. To improve the diversity of the attack
model, the adversary obtains multiple shadow original mod-
els by randomly sampling multiple subsets of samples from
the shadow positive dataset Dsp. For each shadow original
model,the adversary randomly generates a set of deletion re-
quests and trains a sequence of shadow unlearned models. In
Section 5.5, we will conduct empirical experiments to show
the impact of the number of shadow original models on the
attack performance.
Training Attack Model. Given sets of positive cases with
features and negative cases with features, we rely on four
standard and widely used classifiers for our attack model:
logistic regression, decision tree, random forest, and multi-
layer perceptron.
3.3 Feature Construction
Given the two posteriors, a straightforward approach to ag-
gregate the information is to concatenate them, i.e., Po||Pu,
where || is the concatenation operation. This preserves the
full information. However, it is possible that the concatena-
tion contains redundancy. In order to reduce redundancy, we
can instead rely on the difference between Po and Pu to cap-
ture the discrepancy left by the deletion of the target sample.
In particular, we make use of the element-wise difference
Po−Pu and the Euclidean distance ‖Po−Pu‖2.
In order to better capture the level of confidence of the
model, one may also sort the posterior before the difference
or concatenation operations [16]. Specifically, we sort the
original posterior Po in descending order and get the sorted
original posterior Pso. We then rearrange the order of the
unlearned posterior Pu to align its elements with Po, and get
the sorted unlearned posterior Psu.
To summarize, we adopt the following five methods to
construct the feature for the attack model:
• Direct concatenate (DirectConcat), i.e., Po||Pu
• Sorted concatenate (SortedConcat), i.e., Pso||Psu
• Direct difference (DirectDiff), i.e., Po−Pu.
• Sorted difference (SortedDiff), i.e., Pso−Psu.
• Euclidean distance (EucDist), i.e., ‖Po−Pu‖2
In Section 5.3, we conduct empirical experiments to eval-
uate the performance of the above methods and summarize a
feature choice guidance.
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Figure 2: Training process of the attack model. The shadow dataset Ds is split into disjoint shadow positive dataset Dsp and shadow
negative dataset Dsn. The shadow positive dataset Dsp is used to train the shadow original model M so . The shadow unlearned model
M s,iu is trained on Dsp \ xip, where xip ∈Dsp. In the inference phase, the adversary first uses target sample xip to query the original and
unlearned models simultaneously to generate the positive features. Then she uses a random sample xin ∈Dsn to query the corresponding
models to generate the negative features. Finally, she uses the positive and negative features to train the attack model MA.
4 Privacy Degradation Measurement
In this paper, we aim to evaluate to what extent machine un-
learning may degrade the membership privacy of an individ-
ual whose data sample has been deleted from the training set
(we also call this the target sample). Specifically, we want
to quantify the additional privacy degradation our attack has
over classical membership inference (or the improvement of
membership inference) in order to measure the unintended
information leakage due to data deletion in machine learn-
ing. To this end, we propose two privacy degradation met-
rics that measure the difference of the confidence levels of
our attack and classical membership inference in predicting
the right membership status of the target sample.
Given n target samples x1 to xn, define piu as the confidence
of our attack for classifying xi as a member, and pim as the
confidence of classical membership inference. Let bi be the
true status of xi, i.e., bi = 1 if xi is a member, and bi = 0
otherwise. With that, we define the following two metrics:
• DegCount. DegCount stands for Degradation Count. It
calculates the proportion of target samples whose true
membership status is predicted with higher confidence
by our attack than by classical membership inference.
Formally, DegCount is defined as
DegCount =
1
n
n
∑
i
[
bi1piu>pim +(1−bi)1piu<pim
]
where 1P is the indicator function which equals 1 if P
is true; otherwise equals 0. Higher DegCount means
higher privacy degradation level.
• DegRate. DegRate stands for Degradation Rate. It cal-
culates the average confidence improvement rate of our
attack predicting the true membership status compared
to classical membership inference. DegRate can be for-
mally defined as
DegRate =
1
n
n
∑
i
[
bi(piu− pim)+(1−bi)(pim− piu)
]
Higher DegRate means higher privacy degradation
level.
5 Evaluation
In this section, we conduct extensive experiments to evaluate
the unintended privacy risks of machine unlearning. We first
conduct an end-to-end experiment to validate the effective-
ness of our attack on multiple datasets using the most legit
unlearning method, i.e., retraining from scratch. Second, we
compare different feature construction methods proposed in
Section 3.3 and summarize a principle for choosing among
them. Third, we evaluate the impact of overfitting and dif-
ferent hyperparameters on our attack. Fourth, we conduct
experiments to evaluate dataset and model transferability be-
tween shadow model and target model. Finally, we show the
effectiveness of our attack against group deletion and SISA
unlearning method.
5.1 Experimental Setup
Environment. All algorithms are implemented in Python
3.7 and all the experiments are conducted on a server with
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Intel Xeon E7-8867 v3 @ 2.50GHz and 1.5TB memory.
Datasets. We run experiments on two different types of
datasets: categorical dataset and image dataset. The cat-
egorical datasets are used to evaluate the vulnerability of
simple machine learning models, such as logistic regression
(LR), decision tree (DT), random forest (RF), and multi-
layer perceptron (MLP). The image datasets are used to eval-
uate the vulnerability of state-of-the-art convolutional neu-
ral networks, such as ResNet [24]. We use the following
datasets in our experiment.
• UCI Adult [1]. UCI Adult is a widely used categori-
cal dataset for classification. It is a census dataset that
contains around 50,000 samples with 14 features, in-
cluding race, gender, occupation, etc. The original clas-
sification task is to predict whether the income of a per-
son is over $50k, which is a binary classification task.
To evaluate the performance of multi-class classifica-
tion, we transform the occupation feature into a label
in our experiment, with 12 possible classes for this la-
bel. For ease of presentation, we denote these two tasks
as two different datasets, namely Adult (income) and
Adult (occupation).
• US Accident [2]. US Accident is a countrywide traffic
accident dataset, which covers 49 states of the United
States. This dataset contains around 3M samples. We
filter out attributes with too many missing values and
obtain 30 valid features. The valid features include tem-
perature, humidity, pressure, etc. The classification task
is to predict the accident severity level which contains 3
classes.
• Insta-NY [6]. This dataset contains a collection of
Instagram users’ location check-in data in New York.
Each check-in contains a location and a timestamp; and
each location belongs to a category. We use the number
of check-ins that happened at each location in each hour
on a weekly basis as the location feature vector. The
classification task is to predict each location’s category
among 9 different categories. After filtering out loca-
tions with less than 50 check-ins, we get 19,215 loca-
tions for Insta-NY dataset. Later in the section, we also
make use of check-ins in Los Angeles, namely Insta-
LA [6], for evaluating the data transferring attack. This
dataset includes 16,472 locations.
• MNIST [3]. MNIST is an image dataset widely use for
classification. It is a 10-class handwritten digits dataset
which contains 42,000 samples, each being formatted
into a 28×28-pixel image.
• CIFAR10 [4]. CIFAR10 is the benchmark dataset used
to evaluate image recognition algorithms. This dataset
contains 60,000 colored images of size 32× 32, which
are equally distributed on the following 10 classes: air-
plane, automobile, bird, cat, deer, dog, frog, horse, ship,
and truck. There are 50,000 training images and 10,000
testing images.
Metrics. In addition to the two privacy degradation metrics
proposed in Section 4, we also rely on the traditional AUC
metric to measure the absolute performance of our attack and
classical membership inference. To summarize, we have the
following three metrics:
• AUC. It is a widely used metric to measure the per-
formance of binary classification in a range of thresh-
olds [6, 15, 22, 30, 41, 42, 46, 49, 64, 66]. It tells how
much the attack model is capable of distinguishing be-
tween member and non-member. Higher AUC value
implies better ability to predict the membership status.
An AUC value equals to 1 shows a maximum perfor-
mance (true-positive rate of 1 with false-positive rate
of 0) while an AUC value of 0.5 shows a performance
equivalent to random guessing.
• DegCount. It stands for Degradation Count, which is
defined in Section 4.
• DegRate. It stands for Degradation Rate, which is de-
fined in Section 4.
Experimental Setting. We evenly split each dataset D into
disjoint target dataset Dt and shadow dataset Ds. In Sec-
tion 5.6, we will show that the shadow dataset can come from
a different distribution than the target dataset. The shadow
dataset Ds is further split into shadow positive dataset Dsp
and shadow negative dataset Dsn (80% for Dsp and 20% for
Dsn). We randomly sample So subsets of samples from Dsp,
each containing Sr samples, to train So shadow original mod-
els. Let us denote the training dataset for the shadow original
modelM s,io asDs,io , whereDs,io ⊂Dsp. For each shadow orig-
inal model M s,io , we train Su shadow unlearned models on
Ds,io \ x, where x is randomly sampled from Ds,io . We then
follow the procedure in Section 3.2 to construct the training
dataset for the attack model, and train the attack model using
different classifiers. By default, we set the hyperparameters
of the shadow models to So = 20,Sr = 5000,Su = 100.
Similarly, the target dataset Dt is split into target positive
dataset Dtp and target negative dataset Dtn. Following the
same procedure as for the shadow dataset, we train To tar-
get original models, each containing Tr samples and generat-
ing Tu unlearned models. The data generated by the shadow
models serve as training data for the attack model, while the
data generated by the target models serve as testing data. By
default, we set the hyperparameters of the target models to
To = 20,Tr = 5000,Tu = 100. The model parameter settings
of logistic regression, decision tree, random forest and multi-
layer perceptron are listed in Appendix B.
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Figure 3: [Higher means greater privacy degradation for the three metrics] Privacy degradation level on Scratch method for cate-
gorical datasets. Rows stand for different datasets, columns stand for different metrics. In each subfig, the groups in x-axis represent
the different attack models, and the legends (in different colors) represent the different target models. For the AUC metric, the right
bars (transparent ones) stand for the AUC value of classical membership inference.
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Figure 4: [Higher means greater privacy degradation for the three metrics] Privacy degradation level on Scratch method for image
datasets. In each subfig, the groups in x-axis stand for different attack models, the legends (in different colors) stand for different
datasets and the corresponding target models. For the AUC metric, the right bars (transparent ones) stand for the AUC value of
classical membership inference.
5.2 Evaluation of the Scratch Method
In this subsection, we conduct end-to-end experiment to
evaluate our attack against the most legit unlearning ap-
proach of retraining the ML model from scratch. We start
by considering the scenario where only one sample is deleted
for each unlearned model. The scenario where multiple sam-
ples are deleted before the ML model is retrained will be
evaluated in Section 5.7. We conduct the experiment on both
categorical datasets and image datasets with three evaluation
metrics, namely AUC, DegCount, DegRate.
Figure 3 shows the performance for categorical datasets.
We evaluate the performance on multiple target models and
multiple attack models. Specifically, we use four standard
classifiers for both target models and attack models, resulting
in 16 combinations. The groups on the x-axis represent the
attack models and the color bars (see the legend) represent
the target models. We report here the results with the optimal
features as explained in Section 5.3.
The experimental results show that our attack performs
consistently better than classical membership inference on
all datasets, target models, attack models, and metrics. Com-
pared to classical membership inference, our attack achieves
up to 0.48 improvement of the AUC. The best DegCount and
DegRate values are of 0.94 and 0.40, respectively. This indi-
cates that our attack indeed degrades membership privacy of
the target sample in the machine unlearning setting. Compar-
ing the performance of different target models, we observe
that decision tree is the most vulnerable ML model.
Figure 4 illustrates the performance for the image datasets.
We use a simple convolutional neural network (CNN), whose
architecture is described in Appendix A, as the target model
for both MNIST and CIFAR10 datasets. We further use
ResNet50 for the CIFAR10 datasets. As for the attack model,
we use four standard classifiers, same as in the categorical
datasets. The groups in the x-axis represent the attack mod-
els and the color bars (see the legend) represent the datasets
and their corresponding target models. The experimental re-
sults show that CIFAR10 trained with ResNet50 is the most
vulnerable case. The reason behind is that the overfitting
level of CIFAR10 trained with ResNet50 is the largest. From
Table 1, we observe that the overfitting level of CIFAR10
trained with ResNet50 is 0.260, while both MNIST and CI-
FAR10 trained with simple CNNs have an overfitting level
smaller than 0.05.
5.3 Finding Optimal Features
Figure 5 illustrates the attack AUC of different feature con-
struction methods. We compare two different types of target
models: (a) the well-generalized model logistic regression
(trained on Insta-NY dataset), and (b) the overfitted model
ResNet50 (trained on CIFAR10 dataset). The readers can
refer to Table 1 for the overfitting values, and we will fur-
ther discuss the impact of overfitting in Section 5.4. We then
apply the 5 different feature construction methods proposed
in Section 3.3 to 4 different attack models, resulting in 20
combinations. For comparison, we also include the classical
membership inference as a baseline.
Concatenation vs. Difference. Concatenation-based
methods (DirectConcat, SortedConcat) directly concatenate
the two posteriors to preserve the full information, while
difference-based methods capture the discrepancy between
two versions of posteriors. We use two approaches to cap-
ture this discrepancy: element-wise difference (DirectDiff,
SortedDiff) and Euclidean distance (EucDist).
Overall, Figure 5 shows that, on the one hand,
concatenation-based methods perform better on the overfit-
ted model, i.e., ResNet50. On the other hand, the difference-
based methods perform better on the well-generalized
model, i.e., logistic regression.
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Figure 5: Attack AUC for different feature construction meth-
ods for target models (a) logistic regression (trained on Insta-
NY dataset) and (b) ResNet50 (trained on CIFAR10 dataset).
DC, SC, DD, SD, ED stand for DirectConcat, SortedConcat,
DirectDiff, SortedDiff, EucDist, respectively. BL stands for the
baseline, i.e., classical membership inference.
The reason behind this is that the concatenation-based
methods exploit similar information as classical membership
inference, namely the plain posterior information. We can
observe from Figure 5b that, classical membership inference
performs well on an overfitted target model, which is consis-
tent with the conclusion of previous studies [49, 54]. Thus,
our attack should also perform well on an overfitted target
model by using similar type information, i.e., the plain pos-
terior information. Our attack outperforms classical mem-
bership inference on the overfitted target model essentially
because of the additional posterior it uses from the unlearned
model. On the other hand, instead of using plain posterior in-
formation, the difference-based methods capture the discrep-
ancy between two versions of the posterior due to the dele-
tion of the target sample, i.e., the imprint of the target sam-
ple. Therefore, these methods, such as EucDist, can achieve
more than 0.95 AUC on the well-generalized model (regard-
less of the attack model), while the corresponding AUC of
classical membership inference is close to 0.5, i.e., equiva-
lent to random guessing.
Sorted vs. Unsorted. Comparing DirectConcat to
SortedConcat and DirectDiff to SortedDiff in Figure 5,
we observe that attack AUC of both concatenation-based
method and difference-based method are clearly better af-
ter sorting. These results confirm our conjecture that sorting
could improve the confidence level of the adversary.
Feature Selection Summary. Our empirical comparison
provides us with the following rules for the feature con-
struction methods: (1) use concatenation-based methods on
overfitted models; (2) use difference-based methods on well-
generalized models; (3) sort posteriors before the concatena-
tion and difference operations.
Table 1: Attack AUC in different overfitting levels. Values in
the parentheses stand for the AUC value of classical member-
ship inference. Due to space limitation, we use Adult (inc) and
Adult (occ) to denote Adult (income) and Adult (occupation),
respectively.
Dataset Target Model Overfitting AUC
Adult (inc)
LR 0.013 0.600 (0.505)
DT 0.017 0.882 (0.497)
RF 0.009 0.544 (0.509)
Adult (occ)
LR 0.016 0.507 (0.506)
DT 0.017 0.903 (0.506)
RF 0.043 0.611 (0.507)
Accident
LR 0.022 0.538 (0.494)
DT 0.025 0.929 (0.501)
RF 0.026 0.572 (0.497)
Insta-NY
LR 0.096 0.983 (0.490)
DT 0.024 0.941 (0.503)
RF 0.081 0.685 (0.551)
MNIST CNN 0.018 0.511 (0.496)
CIFAR10 CNN 0.036 0.507 (0.502)ResNet50 0.260 0.719 (0.548)
5.4 Impact of Overfitting
Overfitting measures the accuracy gap between training and
testing datasets. Previous studies [54, 63] have shown that
overfitted models are more susceptible to classical member-
ship inference attacks, while well-generalized models are al-
most immune to them. In this subsection, we want to revisit
the impact of overfitting on our attack.
Table 1 depicts the attack AUC for different overfitting
levels. We use random forest as attack model, use SortedDiff
and SortedConcat as feature construction method for well-
generalized and overfitted target model, respectively. The
experimental results show that our attack can still correctly
infer the membership status of the target sample in well-
generalized models. For example, when the target model
is a decision tree, the overfitting level in Adult (income)
dataset is 0.017, thus decision tree can be regarded as a
well-generalized model. While the performance of classical
membership inference on this model is equivalent to random
guessing (AUC = 0.497), our attack performs very well, with
an AUC of 0.882. In general, we observe that our attack per-
formance is relatively independent of the overfitting level.
5.5 Hyperparameter Sensitivity
We now evaluate the impact of different hyperparameters on
the performance of our attack. Specifically, we want to know
the impact of the number of shadow original models So, the
number of samples Sr per shadow original model and the
number of unlearned models Su per shadow original model.
The corresponding hyperparameters of the target models are
fixed (as defined at the end of Section 5.1), since only the hy-
9
Table 2: Attack AUC for dataset and model transfer. Names
in the left of arrows stand for configurations of shadow model.
Values in the parentheses stand for the attack AUC of the classi-
cal membership inference. Columns stand for dataset transfer,
rows stand for model transfer.
Shadow→Target NY→NY NY→LA
DT→DT 0.944 (0.491) 0.931 (0.503)
DT→LR 0.964 (0.494) 0.974 (0.513)
LR→LR 0.986 (0.505) 0.982 (0.511)
LR→DT 0.927 (0.502) 0.926 (0.508)
perparameters of the shadow models can be tuned to launch
the attack.
We conduct the experiments on Adult (income) dataset
with decision tree as target model. Following our findings in
Section 5.3, we evaluate the attack AUC of different combi-
nation of attack models, i.e., decision tree, random forest and
logistic regression, and difference-based feature construction
methods, i.e., DirectDiff, SortedDiff, EucDist.
Number of Shadow Original Models So. Figure 6a de-
picts the impact of So, which varies from 1 to 100. The fig-
ure shows that the attack AUC sharply increases when So
increases from 1 to 5, but remains quite stable for greater
values of So. This indicates that setting So = 5 is enough for
the diversity of shadow original model.
Number of Samples Sr per Shadow Original
Model. Figure 6b illustrates the impact of Sr
∈ {500,1000,2000,5000,10000}. When Sr increases
from 500 to 1000, the attack AUC with SortedDiff increases
from 0.67 to 0.83, while the attack AUC with EucDist
increases from 0.73 to 0.86, except for logistic regression.
However, adding more than 1000 samples does not help
improve the attack performance further.
Number of Unlearned Models Su per Shadow Original
Model. Figure 6c illustrates the impact of Su, which varies
from 1 to 100. The experimental result shows that Su has
negligible impact on the attack AUC. This indicates that us-
ing a few unlearned models is sufficient to achieve a high
attack performance.
5.6 Attack Robustness
In this subsection, we conduct experiments to validate the
dataset and model transferability between shadow model and
target model. That is, we evaluate whether the adversary can
use a different dataset and model architecture than the target
model to train the shadow models.
We use Insta-NY and Insta-LA datasets to perform the
dataset transferring attack. As described in Section 5.1, these
two datasets contain check-in data from different cities, thus
have different distributions. We use Insta-NY dataset to train
the shadow models and Insta-LA dataset to train the target
model. We evaluate the dataset transferability for two target
models (decision tree and logistic regression) with logistic
regression as the attack model. The results are given in Ta-
ble 2. We break the table into two parts: the upper two rows
gives results when the shadow model is the decision tree; and
the lower two rows are for logistic regression. Within each
part, the lower row indicates results for model transfer, and
the right column is for dataset transfer.
Dataset Transferability. Comparing the AUC values of the
transfer setting with that of the non-transfer setting, we only
observe a small performance drop for all target models. For
instance, when the target model is decision tree, the attack
AUC of transfer setting and non-transfer setting are 0.944
and 0.931, respectively. The attack AUC only drops by 1%.
Model Transferability. For model transferring attack, we
evaluate the pairwise transferability among target models de-
cision tree and logistic regression. In Table 2, unbold rows in
column NY→NY illustrate the performance of model trans-
fer. The experimental results show that model transfer only
slightly degrade the attack performance of our attack. For
example, when the shadow model and target model are both
logistic regression, the attack AUC equals to 0.986. When
we change the target model to decision tree, the attack AUC
is still of 0.927.
Dataset and Model Transferability. Unbold rows of col-
umn NY→LA in Table 2 show the attack AUC when we
transfer both the dataset and the model simultaneously. Even
in this setting, our attack can still achieve pretty good perfor-
mance. This result shows that our attack is robust to both dif-
ferent dataset distribution and different model architecture.
5.7 Evaluation of Group Deletion
So far, we have focused on the scenario where only one sam-
ple was deleted for each unlearned model. However, there
could exist cases where a group of samples are deleted be-
fore generating the unlearned model. This can happen when
multiple data owners request the deletion of their data at the
same time, or when the model owner caches the deletion re-
quests and updates the model only when he has received nu-
merous requests to save computational resources.
In this subsection, we conduct experiments to show the
performance of our attack in the group deletion scenario. We
randomly delete 10 data samples from each original model
to generate the unlearned model. We evaluate our attack on
the Insta-NY dataset with three metrics, four different target
models, and four different attack models. For each attack
model, we select the best features following the principles
described in Section 5.3.
The experimental results in Figure 7 show that our attack
is still effective, even though the attack performance of group
deletion is slightly worse than single sample deletion (see
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Figure 6: Impact of different hyperparameters on Adult (income) dataset with decision tree as target model. The legends stand for 5
combinations of attack models and feature construction methods.
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Figure 7: [Higher means larger privacy degradation for the three metrics] Privacy degradation level for group deletion on Insta-NY
dataset. In each subfig, the groups in x-axis stand for different attack models, the legends (in different colors) stand for different
target models. For the AUC metric, the right bars (transparent ones) stand for the AUC value of classical membership inference.
Figure 3). For example, when the target model is logistic re-
gression and attack model is random forest, the attack AUC
of single deletion and group deletion are 0.983 and 0.914, re-
spectively. The reason is that a single sample could be hidden
among the group of deleted samples, thereby preserving its
membership information. This result reveals that conducting
group deletion could mitigate, to some extent, the impact of
our attack.
5.8 Evaluation of the SISA Method
The unlearning algorithm we focused on so far is retraining
from scratch, which can become computationally prohibitive
for large datasets and complex models. Several approximate
unlearning algorithms have been proposed to accelerate the
training process. In this subsection, we evaluate the perfor-
mance of our attack against the most general approximate
unlearning algorithm, SISA [9].
We remind the readers that the main idea of SISA is to
split the original dataset into k disjoint shards and train k
sub-models. In the inference phase, the model owner aggre-
gates the prediction of each sub-model to produce the global
prediction using some aggregation algorithm. In this experi-
ment, we set k = 5 and use posterior average as aggregation
algorithm.
Figure 8 illustrates the performance of SISA. The experi-
ment is conducted on the Insta-NY dataset with three metrics
reported. We report the experimental results of four differ-
ent target models and four different attack models. For each
attack model, we select the best features following the prin-
ciples described in Section 5.3.
The experimental results show that our attack performance
drops compared to the Scratch algorithm. Now, only the
target model LR is prone to a significant drop in privacy due
to unlearning. One possible reason is that the aggregation
algorithm of SISA reduces the influence of a specific sample
on its global model.
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Figure 8: [Higher means larger privacy degradation for the three metrics] Privacy degradation level for SISA method on Insta-NY
dataset. In each subfig, groups in x-axis stand for different attack models, the legends (in different colors) stand for different target
models. For AUC metric, the right bars (transparent ones) stand for AUC values of classical membership inference.
6 Possible Defenses
This paper takes the first step to investigate the privacy risks
stemming from machine unlearning. Extensive experiments
have demonstrated that publishing unlearned model could
degrade the membership privacy of a target whose data has
been deleted. In this section, we present two possible de-
fense mechanisms and empirically evaluate their effective-
ness. The main idea of both mechanisms is to reduce the
information accessible to the adversary [54].
Publishing the Top-k Confidence Values. This defense re-
duces attacker’s knowledge by only publishing the top k con-
fidence values of the posteriors returned by both original and
unlearned models. Formally, we denote the posterior vec-
tor as P = [p1, p2, · · · , p`], where ` is the number of classes
of the target model and pi is the confidence value of class
i. When the target model receives a query, the model owner
calculates posterior P and sorts it in descending order, result-
ing in Ps = [ps1, ps2, · · · , ps`]. The model owner then publishes
the first k values in Ps, i.e., [ps1, ps2, · · · , psk].
In the machine unlearning setting, the top k confidence
values of the original model and the unlearned model may
not correspond to the same set of classes. To launch our
attack, the adversary constructs a pseudo-complete poste-
rior vector for both original model and unlearned model.
The pseudo-complete posterior takes the published confi-
dence value for their corresponding classes, and evenly dis-
tributes the remaining confidence value to other classes, i.e.,
for j ∈ {k+ 1, . . . , `}, psj =
1−(ps1+ps2+···+psk)
`−k . The adversary
can then launch our attack using the pseudo-complete poste-
rior.
Table 3 shows the experimental results of Top-1, Top-2
and Top-3 defenses. We conduct experiment on Insta-NY
dataset and Adult (occupation) datasets. For Adult (occupa-
tion) dataset, we report the results of decision tree as target
model; for Insta-NY dataset, we report the results of decision
tree and logistic regression as target model. For each dataset,
we report the performance of 4 different attack models, each
selecting the best feature following the principle described
in Section 5.3. The results show that publishing top k confi-
dence value cannot significantly mitigate our attack.
Publishing the Label Only. This defense further reduces
the information accessible to the adversary by only publish-
ing the predicted label instead of confidence values (posteri-
ors). To launch our attack, the adversary also needs to con-
struct the pseudo-complete posterior for both original model
and unlearned model. The main idea is to set the confidence
value of the predicted class as 1, and set the confidence value
of other classes as 0.
Table 3 illustrates the performance of the “label only” de-
fense. The experimental setting is similar to Top-k defense.
The experimental results show that the “label only” defense
can effectively mitigate our attack in all cases. The reason
is that deleting one sample is unlikely to change the output
label of a specific target sample.
We leave the in-depth exploration of effective defense
mechanisms against our attack as a future work.
7 Related Work
Machine Unlearning. The notion of machine unlearning
was first proposed in [10], which is the application of the
right to be forgotten in the machine learning context. The
most legit approach to implement machine unlearning is
to remove the revoked samples from the original training
dataset and retrain the ML model from scratch. However,
retraining from scratch incurs very high computational over-
head when the dataset is large and when the revoke requests
happen frequently. Thus, most of the previous studies in ma-
chine unlearning focus on reducing the computational over-
head of the unlearning process [7, 9, 10, 27, 50].
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Table 3: Attack AUC of the defense mechanisms. No defense stands for the baseline attack without applying any defense mechanisms.
Top-1 Top-2, Top-3 stand for publishing the Top-k confidence values. Label stands for the label only defense.
Dataset (Target Model) Attack Model No defense Top-1 Top-2 Top-3 Label
Adult (occupation) (DT)
RF 0.916 0.899 0.906 0.911 0.501
DT 0.918 0.903 0.906 0.910 0.506
LR 0.918 0.904 0.907 0.911 0.506
MLP 0.918 0.904 0.909 0.907 0.493
Insta-NY (DT)
RF 0.937 0.930 0.931 0.942 0.506
DT 0.938 0.932 0.932 0.943 0.502
LR 0.928 0.923 0.927 0.926 0.502
MLP 0.928 0.923 0.927 0.929 0.505
Insta-NY (LR)
RF 0.976 0.947 0.965 0.965 0.546
DT 0.972 0.946 0.961 0.961 0.546
LR 0.969 0.948 0.960 0.962 0.546
MLP 0.970 0.948 0.960 0.966 0.453
Cao and Yang [10] proposed to transform the learning al-
gorithms into summation form that follows statistical query
learning, breaking down the dependencies of training data.
To remove a data sample, the model owner only needs to re-
move the transformations of this data sample from the sum-
mations that depend on this sample. However, the algorithm
in [10] is not applicable to learning algorithms that cannot be
transformed into summation form, such as neural networks.
Thus, Bourtoule et al. [9] proposed a more general algo-
rithm named SISA. The main idea of SISA is to split the
training data into several disjoint shards, with each shard
training one sub-model. To remove a specific sample, the
model owner only needs to retrain the sub-model that con-
tains this sample. To further speed up the unlearning pro-
cess, the authors proposed to split each shard into several
slices and store the intermediate model parameters when the
model is updated by each slice.
Another line of machine unlearning study aims to ver-
ify whether the model owner complies with the data dele-
tion request. Sommer et al. [55] proposed a backdoor-based
method. The main idea is to allow the data owners to im-
plant a backdoor in their data before training the ML model
in the MLaaS setting. When the data owners later request
to delete their data, they can verify whether their data have
been deleted by checking the backdoor success rate.
The research problem in this paper is orthogonal to pre-
vious studies. Our goal is to quantify the unintended pri-
vacy risks for deleted samples in machine learning systems
when the adversary has access to both original model and
unlearned model. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is
the first to investigate this problem.
Although quantifying privacy risks of machine unlearning
has not been investigated yet, there are multiple studies on
quantifying the privacy risks in the general right to be forgot-
ten setting. For example, Xue et al. [62] demonstrate that in
search engine applications, the right to be forgotten can en-
able an adversary to discover deleted URLs when there are
inconsistent regulation standards in different regions. Ellers
et al. [13] demonstrate that, in network embeddings, the right
to be forgotten enables an adversary to recover the deleted
nodes by leveraging the difference between the two versions
of the network embeddings.
Membership Inference. Membership inference attacks
have been extensively studied in many different data do-
mains, ranging from biomedical data [5, 22, 26] to mobility
traces [46]. Shokri et al. [54] presented the first membership
inference attack against ML models. The main idea is to use
shadow models to mimic the target model’s behavior to gen-
erate training data for the attack model. Salem et al. [49]
gradually removed the assumptions of [54] by proposing
three different attack methods. Since then, membership
inference has been extensively investigated in various ML
models and tasks, such as federated learning [37], white-box
classification [39], generative adversarial networks [11, 23],
natural language processing [56], and computer vision seg-
mentation [25]. Another line of study focused on investigat-
ing the impact of overfitting [31, 63] and of the number of
classes of the target model [53] on the attack performance.
However, all of the previous studies focus on the classical
ML setting where the adversary only has access to a single
snapshot of the target model. This is the first work studying
membership inference in the machine unlearning context.
To mitigate the threat of membership inference, a plethora
of defense mechanisms have been proposed. These defenses
can be classified into three classes: reducing overfitting, per-
turbing posteriors, and adversarial training. There are sev-
eral ways to reduce overfitting in the ML field, such as L2-
regularization [54], dropout [49], and model stacking [49].
In [32], the authors proposed to explicitly reduce the overfit-
ting by adding to the training loss function a regularization
term, which is defined as the difference between the output
distributions of the training set and the validation set. Jia et
al. [30] proposed a posterior perturbation method inspired by
adversarial example. Nasr et al. [38] proposed an adversar-
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ial training defense to train a secure target classifier. During
the training of the target model, a defender’s attack model is
trained simultaneously to launch the membership inference
attack. The optimization objective of the target model is to
reduce the prediction loss while minimizing the membership
inference attack accuracy.
Attacks against Machine Learning. Besides membership
inference attacks, there exist numerous other types of at-
tacks against ML models [12, 16, 19, 21, 28, 29, 31, 33, 34,
36, 40, 43–45, 47, 48, 51, 52, 57, 58, 60, 61, 65]. Ganju et
al. [16] proposed a property inference attack aiming at in-
ferring general properties of the training data (such as the
proportion of each class in the training data). Model inver-
sion attack [14,15] focuses on inferring the missing attributes
of the target ML model. A major attack type in this space
is adversarial examples [43–45, 57, 65]. In this setting, an
adversary adds carefully crafted noise to samples aiming at
mislead the target classifier. A similar type of attacks is back-
door attack, where the adversary as a model trainer embeds
a trigger into the model for her to exploit when the model
is deployed [19, 36, 48, 61]. Another line of work is model
stealing, Tramèr et al. [58] proposed the first attack on infer-
ring a model’s parameters. Other works focus on inferring a
model’s hyperparameters [40, 60].
8 Conclusion
This paper takes the first step to investigate the unintended
privacy risks in machine unlearning through the lens of mem-
bership inference. We propose several feature construction
methods to summarize the discrepancy between the posteri-
ors returned by original model and unlearned model. Exten-
sive experiments on five different real-world datasets show
that our attack in multiple cases outperform the classical
membership inference attack on the target sample, especially
on well-generalized models. We further present two mech-
anisms by reducing the information accessible to the adver-
sary to mitigate the newly discovered privacy risks. We hope
that these results will help improve privacy in practical im-
plementation of machine unlearning.
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A Architecture of Simple CNN
Table 4: CNN structure and parameter. For the MNIST
dataset, the input_channel Ci equals 1, the image width W and
image height H are both equal to 28. For the CIFAR10 dataset,
the input_channel Ci equals, the image width W and image
height H are both equal to 32. The kernel_size of convolution
layer Kc and Max-pooling layer Km are equal to 3 and 2, respec-
tively.
Layer Parameters
Conv2D_1 (Ci, 32, Kc=3, 1)
Relu -
Conv2D_2 (32, H, Kc, 1)
Maxpolling2D Km=2
Dropout_1 (0.25)
Flatten 1
Linear_1 (H× (W/2−K+1)× (H/2−K+1), 128)
Relu -
Dropout_2 0.5
Linear_2 (128, #classes)
Softmax dim=1
B Model Parameter Settings
We use multiple ML models in our experiments. All models
are implemented by sklearn version 0.22. For reproduction
purpose, we list their parameter settings as follows:
• Logistic Regression: We use LBFGS as solver and L2
penalty for regularization, and set other parameters as
default.
• Decision Tree: We use Gini index as criterion, set pa-
rameter max_leaf_nodes as 10, and set other parameters
as default.
• Random Forest: We use Gini index as criterion, use
100 estimators, set min_samples_leaf=30, and set other
parameters as default.
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• Multi-layer Perceptron: We use SGD as solver, use
ReLu as activation function. The hidden layer size is
128, the learning rate is 0.001, the L2 regularizer is
0.0001.
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